The Treatment of Sexual Impairment Injuries under Worker\u27s Compensation Laws by Dittoe, Jack
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 30 | Issue 4 Article 9
1-1979
The Treatment of Sexual Impairment Injuries under
Worker's Compensation Laws
Jack Dittoe
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jack Dittoe, The Treatment of Sexual Impairment Injuries under Worker's Compensation Laws, 30 Hastings L.J. 1207 (1979).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol30/iss4/9
Notes and Comments




If an employee receives an injury that arises out of and in the
course of employment that renders the employee impotent or sterile,
permanent disability benefits usually are not awarded. California and
most other states award permanent disability benefits only for those
injuries which affect the injured worker's earning capacity,I and sexual-
impairment injuries2 neither generally cause work-related physical lim-
itations,3 fall within the generally accepted meaning of "disfigure-
ment",4 nor cause such serious psychological damage as to
permanently impair the injured worker's earning power.5 Com-
pounding this adverse result is the exclusive-remedy feature of
worker's6 compensation acts which prevents the injured worker from
maintaining a tort suit against the employer.7 Because of this unfortu-
nate combination of factors, the injured employee generally does not
recover for the permanent effects of the injury. The worker receives no
permanent disability benefits under the compensation act and has no
right to sue the employer for damages in a court of law.8
* B.S., 1976, University of California, Berkeley. Member, Third Year Class.
1. See notes 49-59 & accompanying text infra.
2. "Sexual-impairment injuries," as used in this Note, will refer only to those injuries
which cause a loss of sexual power (impotence, or sterility). Impotency is defined as inabil-
ity to complete sexual intercourse. "It may range from some interference with normal sexual
activity to a total inability to perform sexually." 6 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 302 (1960).
Sterility refers to an incapacity to produce offspring. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 2238 (1966). To facilitate discussion, this Note will refer to such inju-
ries as they affect male workers only. Analagous injuries suffered by women, relating to
their inability to engage in sexual activity and reproductive capacity, should be treated
similarly.
3. See notes 71-76 & accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 77-95 & accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 96-110 & accompanying text infra.
6. Prior to an amendment in 1974 to article XX, § 21 of the California Constitution,
the Worker's Compensation Act was known as the Workmen's Compensation Act. See
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3200 (West Supp. 1978).
7. See notes 138-64 & accompanying text infra.
8. This Note will discuss only the remedies available to the worker against the em-
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The worker who sustains such an injury may never again lead a
full, satisfying life. Sex is a component which most people deem basic
to life. The inability to engage in sexual intercourse may cause the
injured worker to feel a sense of humiliation, inadequacy, and em-
barassment when associating with other workers and friends. Such a
loss may also destroy an existing marriage or prevent one from taking
place. The worker's realization that he will never have an opportunity
to beget and raise his own children may be life shattering. The conse-
quences associated with such injuries are far reaching and one can only
speculate as to the severity of the impact on the injured worker's self-
esteem and will to live.
This Note discusses and analyzes the treatment of sex-
ual-impairment injuries under worker's compensation laws. For the
sake of illustration, primary emphasis is placed on California's han-
dling of this specific type of injury. However, alternative approaches
taken by other states are also examined, and the concepts discussed
here are pertinent to most states. Part I presents a basic overview of the
worker's compensation system. It discusses the historical development
of the legislation, the social and economic theories upon which it is
based, the conditions that must be satisfied for compensation to be
granted, the benefits available to injured workers, and the different the-
ories used to determine the existence and degree of permanent partial
disabilities. Part II examines the treatment accorded sex-
ual-impairment injuries in California and various other states. Part III
discusses the exclusive remedy feature of the compensation acts and the
fairness of the so-called "quid pro quo" with respect to sex-
ual-impairment injuries. Part IV examines proposals which would
eliminate or ameliorate the harshness of the current California scheme.
The Note concludes that to provide the injured worker with a tort rem-
edy against the employer would be the most equitable solution for all
parties.
Overview of the Worker's Compensation System
History
Under the common law, the worker's sole remedy against the em-
ployer for work related personal injury was a tort action for negli-
gence. 9 However, because of the expense and time-consuming nature
of litigation, the difficulty of proving the employer's violation of due
care, and the common-law defenses of contributory negligence, as-
ployer. Third party, co-employee, and product liability suits are beyond the scope of this
discussion.
9. 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION § 1.02(1) (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as HANNA].
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sumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule, this common-law remedy
proved to be inadequate.' 0 In fact, it has been estimated that under the
common law, seventy to ninety-four percent of industrial accidents
went uncompensated." Employer liability acts attempted to remedy
these inadequacies by modifying the defenses available to the em-
ployer. These acts failed in this attempt because the injured employee
was still required to bear the burden of civil litigation and to establish
the employer's fault.' 2 As stated by a noted authority, "[t]he necessity
for workmen's compensation legislation arose out of the coincidence of
a sharp increase in industrial accidents attending the rise of the factory
system and a simultaneous decrease in the employee's common-law
remedies for his injuries."' 3 Because the principles of worker's com-
pensation represented such a marked departure from established legal
concepts, the courts struck down the first few compensation acts as vio-
lative of state and federal constitutions. 14 However, shortly thereafter,
they began to take a broader view of the problem, and in 1917 the
United States Supreme Court ruled that worker's compensation legisla-
tion was constitutional. 15
California's first worker's compensation law, the Roseberry Act,
was passed in 1911.16 When few employers elected to become subject
to its provisions, a compulsory law known as the Boynton Act was en-
acted in 1913.17 This act eliminated the element of negligence and
10. Id. § 1.02(3).
11. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 530 & n.32 (4th ed. 1971).
12. 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 1.03(3). Hanna lists the following shortcomings of the
employer liability system: (1) insufficient compensation-recoveries were frequently inade-
quate to make up for the loss incurred; (2) wastefulness of the system-a large percentage of
the recovery had to pay for court costs and attorney fees; (3) delays-trials were often very
lengthy ordeals while the injured worker's needs were often immediate; (4) antagonism be-
tween the employer and employee. Id.
13. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4.00 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as LARSON].
14. 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 1.04(2)(d).
15. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v.
Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
16. Cal. Stat. 1911, ch. 399, at 796 (repealed 1937).
17. Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 176, at 279 (repealed 1937). The Boynton Act was enacted
pursuant to the authority granted under article XX, § 21 of the California Constitution.
Section 21, as later amended in 1918, declared: "The legislature is hereby vested with ple-
nary power, unlimited by any provision of this Constitution, to create and enforce a com-
plete system of workmen's compensation by appropriate legislation, and in that behalf to
create and enforce a liability on the part of any or all persons to compensate any or all of
their workmen for injury or disability, and their dependents for death incurred or sustained
by the said workmen in the course of their employment, irrespective of the fault of any
party." CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 21. The authority for such legislation is the state's police
power. Western Indem. Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 694, 151 P. 398, 401 (1915) (citing
State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 177-78, 117 P. 1101, 1106 (1911)); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3201
(West 1971). The current worker's compensation act, referred to as the Labor Code, was
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divested the civil courts of jurisdiction over industrial injuries.
Rationale of Worker's Compensation Legislation
The common-law remedy of negligence was viewed as inequitable
and unsuited to the conditions of modern industry because it involved
intolerable delay, caused great economic waste and gave inadequate
relief for loss and suffering. 8 Worker's compensation legislation aban-
doned the legal concept of "fault." Its rationale is that "the cost of the
product should bear the blood of the workman."' 9 Human accident
losses are treated as legitimate costs of production allocated to the em-
ployer. The employer then distributes these costs among the consum-
ing public. 20 It is the employment relationship which imposes an
obligation upon the employer to compensate employees who have sus-
tained injuries in the course of their work.
21
Worker's Compensation Objectives
The objective of worker's compensation is to protect workers
against economic insecurity. It is a scheme designed to replace a part
of the earning power of the employee lost by injury or death. As
was eloquently stated in Union Iron Works v. Industrial Accident
Commission,22
[T]he primary purpose of industrial compensation is to insure to the
injured employee and those dependent upon him adequate means of
subsistence while he is unable to work and also to bring about his
recovery as soon as possible in order that he may be returned to the
ranks of productive labor. By this means society as a whole is re-
lieved of the burden of caring for the injured workman and his fam-
ily, and the burden is placed upon the industry.
2 3
A compensation award, unlike a tort recovery, does not restore to the
enacted in 1937. Cal. Stat. 1937, ch. 90, at 185 (currently codified at CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 3201-4649 (West 1971)).
18. Western Indem. Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 693, 151 P. 398, 401 (1915).
19. This statement has been attributed to David Lloyd George. W. PROSSER. THE LAW
OF TORTS 530 n.37 (4th ed. 1971).
20. Larson states that it is not accurate to say the public ultimately pays the cost of
worker's compensation. "[Ilt is more precise to say that the consumer of a particular product
ultimately pays the cost of compensation protection for the workers engaged in its manufac-
ture." 1 LARSON, supra note 13, § 3.20.
21. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923); Deauville v. Hale,
188 Cal. App. 2d 535, 539-40, 10 Cal. Rptr. 511, 513 (1961).
22. 190 Cal. 33, 210 P. 410 (1922).
23. 1d. at 39, 210 P. at 413. Most writers consider worker's compensation to be social
insurance that can be grouped with unemployment insurance and social security. One noted
writer stated that "[t]he real characteristic Jf social insurance is the fact that the worker is
entitled to the benefits as a matter of right." Riesenfeld, Forty Years ofAmerican Workmen's
Compensation, 35 MINN. L. REV. 525, 530 (1951). Larson disagrees with that analysis and
states that unlike social insurance, the operative mechanism of worker's compensation is
[Vol. 30
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injured worker what he has lost.24 Instead, it grants the employee a
sum which, when supplemented by his remaining earning capacity, will




In general, two conditions must be concurrently satisfied to estab-
lish a claim under a worker's compensation act:26 (1) the existence of
an employment relationship; and (2) an injury which arises out of and
in the course and scope of employment. A worker is usually considered
an employee when he performs services under the control and direction
of the employer for a consideration.27 An injury "arises out of the em-
ployment" if it occurs by reason of a condition of or in connection with
the employment. 28 An injury occurs "in the course of employment"
when the employee is "acting within the scope of his authority or as-
signment, at a time within the period of his employment, and at a place
where he may reasonably be for that purpose.
12 9
unilateral employer liability with no contribution by the employee. 1 LARSON, supra note
13, § 1.20.
24. The theory of tort is that the victim will be fully relieved from the detrimental
effects of the tortious conduct. Hence, the victim is permitted to receive awards covering
expenses for reduction of past and future earnings, physical rehabilitation, medical treat-
ment, pain, humiliation, loss of standing in the community, shock, suffering, and the like.
Compensation benefits, on the other hand, "merely aim at an alleviation of the deterioration
in the living standards of the victim and his family flowing from the injury." Riesenfeld,
Basic Problems in the Administration of Workmen's Compensation, 36 MINN. L. REv. 119,
122 (1952). Amounts for pain and suffering, humiliation, and other social discomforts gen-
erally are not included in a compensation award. Pain and suffering are compensable ele-
ments only when they impair the injured employee's ability to work. Jacobsen v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 212 Cal. 440, 447, 299 P. 66, 68 (1931).
25. 1 LARSON, supra note 13, § 2.50.
26. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971) (conditions of compensation in
California).
27. 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 3.01(1). In California, an employee is defined as "every
person in the service of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or appren-
ticeship, express or implied, oral or written." CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (West Supp. 1978).
There is a presumption that any person rendering service to another, other than an in-
dependent contractor, or one who is expressly excluded, is an employee. CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3357 (West 1971).
28. Madin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 90, 92, 292 P.2d 892, 894 (1956).
"Arising out of" refers to the causal connection between the employment and the injury.
California has adopted the positional risk theory where "an injury is compensable if it
would not have happened but for the fact that the conditions or obligations of the employ-
ment put the claimant in the position where he was injured." 1 LARSON, supra note 13,
§ 6.00.
29. 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 9.01(l)(b). The words "in the course of employment"
generally refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurs. Id.
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Exclusive remedy
When the specified conditions are met, the relief provided by the
worker's compensation act excludes all other statutory and com-
mon-law remedies against the employer.30 The compensation act pro-
vides the only means by which an injured worker can recover from the
employer for injuries received in the course of and arising out of the
employment. This rule applies even though the claimant may believe
that the employer's negligence can be established, or that it would be
more advantageous to maintain an action at law for damages. 3' In all
cases where the conditions of compensation do not concur, the worker's
compensation act does not apply and the employee is free to bring a
civil action for damages. 3
2
Injury
An employee who sustains an injury within the scope of the
worker's compensation act has a right to recover compensation. 33 A
blow or other traumatic origin is not required: "Injury under California
law may be suffered without the infliction of a flesh wound or other
external trauma." 34 The term is broad enough to cover injuries sus-
tained through the inhalation or ingestion of invisible poisons, occupa-
tional strains, as well as psychic and mental disturbances.
35
Compensation Benefits Available to an Injured Worker
Assuming the injury falls within the compensation act's coverage,
there are three general types of benefits available to the worker: (I)
medical, surgical, and hospital treatment; (2) temporary total and tem-
30. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1978). For a more in-depth discus-
sion of the exclusive remedy feature, see notes 138-64 & accompanying text infra.
31. See Scott v. Pacific Coast Borax Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 173, 178, 294 P.2d 1039,
1043 (1956).
32. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1971).
33. "Compensation embraces every benefit or payment to which an injured employee
is entitled ..... Ramirez v. WCAB, 10 Cal. App. 3d 227, 234, 88 Cal. Rptr. 865, 870
(1970).
34. 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 11.01(2) (b); see CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (West Supp.
1978). In some states, for an injury to come within the compensation act's coverage, it must
have been sustained by "accident."
35. 2 HANNA, supra note 9. § 11.01(2)(b). "Injury" includes mental as well as physical
injury. To the extent that traumatic neuroses are disabling and attributable to the employ-
ment, they are entitled to be treated as injuries under the worker's compensation law. Id.
§ 11.01(2)(e). See also IA LARSON, supra note 13, § 42.22. "An injury may be either: (a)
specific, occurring as the result of one incident or exposure which causes disability or need
for medical treatment; or (b) cumulative, occurring as repetitive mentally or physically trau-
matic activities extending over a period of time, the combined effect of which causes any
disability or need for medical treatment." CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1 (West Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 30
porary partial disability indemnity payments; and (3) permanent total
and permanent partial disability indemnity payments.
In California, the employee is entitled to full medical benefits in
case of an industrial injury.36 It is the employer's duty to provide medi-
cal, surgical, chiropractic, and hospital treatment, including nursing,
medicines and supplies which are reasonably required to cure or relieve
the worker from the effects of the injury.37 If the treatment is reason-
ably necessary, there are no limitations on the amounts or cost of medi-
cal care to be furnished.
In addition to medical benefits, an employee may be entitled to
receive temporary or permanent disability indemnity benefits, each of
which is designed to compensate for a different type of 1oss.38 Tempo-
rary disability is defined as "physical incapacity reasonably expected to
be completely cured or materially improved with proper medical atten-
tion."'39 Such disability exists during the "healing period" when the
employee is recovering from the acute effects of the injury. The pay-
ments are intended to act as a replacement for wages that are lost dur-
ing this "healing period." Temporary total disability exists when the
employee, at the time of payment, is totally incapacitated.4° Tempo-
rary partial disability is present when the injured employee is capable
of some type of gainful employment but is unable to earn as much as
he had prior to the injury.
41
"[A] disability is generally regarded as 'permanent'. . . where fur-
ther change-for better or for worse-is not reasonably to be antici-
pated under usual medical standards. '42 In other words, it is a
disability which will remain substantially the same during the remain-
der of the injured worker's life.43 Permanent total disability benefits
are awarded when the injured worker is precluded from regular work
in any well-known branch of the labor market.44 Permanent partial
disability benefits are paid to the injured employee who suffers a per-
36. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1978).
37. Id. The employer's duty to provide medical treatment is not designed as a penalty
but rather is a component of the compensation due the injured employee. See Union Iron
Works v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 190 Cal. 33, 40, 210 P. 410, 413 (1922).
38. Temporary disability payments are designed as a substitute for -lost wages, while
permanent disability payments are meant to indemnify the injured worker for the impair-
ment of earning capacity or diminished ability to compete in the open labor market. Russell
v. Bankers Life Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 405, 416, 120 Cal. Rptr. 627, 633-34 (1975).
39. 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 13.01(l).
40. See W.M. Lyles Co. v. WCAB, 3 Cal. App. 3d 132, 136, 82 Cal. Rptr. 891, 894
(1969).
41. 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 13.01(3).
42. Sweeney v. Industrial Accident Comn'n, 107 Cal. App. 2d 155, 159, 236 P.2d 651,
653 (1951)(quoting 1 CAMPBELL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 813 (1955)).
43. Id.
44. 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 14.01(2)(a). Permanent total disability may be found as a
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manent injury but is not totally disabled. The basis for the computa-
tion of permanent partial disability benefits is an often elusive and
flexible concept called "disability." Considerable divergence exists
among the states as to what types of losses or injuries are compensable
and to what extent.
45
Theories Used in Determining the Existence and Degree of Permanent
Partial Disabilities
Four different theories are used to fix compensation for permanent
partial disabilities: (1) actual wage loss; (2) whole man; (3) loss of earn-
ing capacity; and (4) dual theory.
"Under the [actual] Wage Loss Theory, compensation for [a per-
manent] partial disability is payable only when bodily impairment re-
sults in loss of wages." 46 If post-injury earnings equal or exceed pre-
injury earnings, no "disability" exists despite the permanent effects of
the injury, and no indemnity benefits are awarded.
Under the whole man theory, bodily impairment alone is the test
of "disability," irrespective of its effect on the injured worker's earning
power or capacity.47 In other words, one may recover for the physical
harm or injury itself, regardless of its economic impact. Under this
doctrine, permanent disability benefits are based on the theory that one
has a right to remain physically whole.
48
The third theory, "loss of earning capacity," is followed in the ma-
jority of jurisdictions. 49 This doctrine bases permanent disability in-
demnity payments on the theoretical effect the injury will have on the
matter of law. In California, there is a conclusive presumption that permanent total disabili-
ties will result from the sustaining of certain injuries. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4662 (West 1971).
45. See 2 LARSON, supra note 13, § 57.10.
46. Dahl, Proposals for Uniform Disability Evaluation in Workmen's Compensation
Cases, 5 FORUM 156, 157 (1970). Michigan and Pennsylvania are often cited as proponents
of this theory. Id. at 158.
47. Id. at 158.
48. See Kostida v. Department of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. 629, 634, 247 P. 1014,
1016 (1926). Though the bodily impairment may not cause a decrease in the employee's
"ability to produce wages in the industrial world, there are other spheres for the employment
of human energy, talents and the possession of physical attributes beside the industrial
world, into the activity of which the defendant is entitled to bring, possess and enjoy all the
physical attributes with which nature endowed him." Hercules Powder Co. v. Morris Com-
mon Pleas, 93 N.J.L. 93, 95, 107 A. 433 (1919). For possible qualifications of this theory in
New Jersey, see Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete, Inc., 64 N.J. 514, 318 A.2d 1 (1974);
Kalson v. Star Elec. Motor Co., 15 N.J. Super. 565, 83 A.2d 656 (1951). For further discu-
sion of this matter, see Lefelt, Toward a New Method of Awarding Compensation Benefts:
Solving the Permanent Partial Problem in New Jersey, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 587, 595-600
(1975).
49. See 2 LARSON, supra note 13, § 57.21. Under worker's compensation, the only in-
juries compensated, apart from medical benefits, are those which produce "disability" and
hence presumably affect earning power. See I LARSON, supra note 13, § 2.40.
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employee's future earnings.50 The determination is based on the extent
to which wage earning capacity has been lost, not only now, but
throughout the injured employee's future work life. Consequently,
physiological or functional impairment, though always a necessary in-
gredient of "disability," 5' is not itself determinative of the existence or
extent of a "disability." In determining the degree of incapacity to earn
wages, a number of factors are often considered, such as the injured
employee's physical condition, age, industrial history, education, and
ability to obtain suitable employment.5 2
In California, permanent disability has been defined as "any im-
pairment of bodily or mental function which. . . causes impairment of
earning capacity, impairment of the normal use of a member, or a com-
petitive handicap in the open labor market. ' 53 Although this statement
might suggest that California takes a two-pronged approach,5 4 in fact it
has embraced the earning capacity theory wholeheartedly. In Marsh v.
IndustrialAccident Commission,55 the court stated that "[t]he law does
not award compensation for mere pain or physical impairment, unless
it is of such character as to raise a presumption of incapacity to earn."'56
The California courts have also declared that if a worker sustains an
injury that does not affect his ability to work, then that worker is not
entitled to compensation (apart from medical benefits) for such in-
jury.5 7 A noted California writer in this field of law states that the basic
premise of worker's compensation is that compensation is awarded for
the disability (diminished employability) which results from an injury
50. The fact the worker is actually earning more money subsequent to the injury is
irrelevant in the awarding of permanent disability benefits. See Department of Motor Vehi-
cles v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 14 Cal. 2d 189, 93 P.2d 131 (1939); 2 LARSON, supra
note 13, § 57.21.
51. "This scheme may not be as liberal as the Whole Man one because theoretically
compensation is not allowed for disability which won't result in lost earnings." Dahl, Pro-
posals for Uniform Disability Evaluation in Workmen's Compensation Cases, 5 FORUM 156,
158-59 (1970).
52. See, e.g., Ball v. Mann, 75 So. 2d 758 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1954); Pascoe v. WCAB, 46
Cal. App. 3d 146, 153, 120 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203 (1975).
53. 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 14.01(2)(a)(interpreting CAL. LAB. CODE § 4660(a) (West
1971)); see note 64 infra. For similar statements, see State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 59 Cal. 2d 45, 52, 27 Cal. Rptr. 702, 707, 377 P.2d 902, 907 (1963); Moyer
v. WCAB, 24 Cal. App. 3d 650, 657, 100 Cal. Rptr. 540, 544 (1972); DeCelle v. City of
Alameda, 186 Cal. App. 2d 574, 581, 9 Cal. Rptr. 549, 554 (1960).
54. One writer has stated that by virtue of Labor Code § 4660(a), calling for dual con-
sideration of incapacity, it is unnecessary for California courts to adopt one theory of com-
pensation to the exclusion of any other. Whitebook, Permanent Partial Disability Under the
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 28 IOWA L. REv. 37, 48 (1942).
55. 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933 (1933).
56. Id. at 344, 18 P.2d at 936.
57. See Solari v. Atlas-Universal Serv., Inc., 215 Cal. App. 2d 587, 600, 30 Cal. Rptr.
407, 414 (1963).
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and not for the physical condition itself.58 In other words, the effects of
the injury on the employee's working ability is determinative as to
whether a "disability" exists.
59
The fourth doctrine used to determine the existence and extent of
a "disability" is the "dual theory." 60 The injured worker's medical im-
pairment and lost earning capacity are each established, and compen-
sation is based upon the higher of the two ratings. Under this theory, a
worker who sustains an injury that does not affect his employability
nevertheless can be compensated.
Scheduled Injuries
Permanent injuries may be classified as scheduled or nonsched-
uled. All worker's compensation acts contain catalogues or schedules
which set forth the amount of compensation to be awarded for the
specified injuries.61 Scheduled injuries are compensated without re-
gard to actual or potential wage loss: the medical condition alone deter-
mines the amount of disability benefits. This is not, however, a
departure from the underlying premise of compensation law-that ben-
efits are awarded for loss of earning capacity and not physical injury
per se. The schedules represent legislative determinations that the enu-
merated losses will conclusively impair the earning capacity of claim-
ants so injured. 62 The schedules are intended to reflect the economic
effect of certain specified injuries upon the "average" worker. Whether
medical conditions not listed in the schedules constitute "disabilities" is
determined by application of one of the theories discussed in the pre-
58. 1 S. HERLICK, CALIFORNIA WORKER'S COMPENSATION HANDBOOK § 7.4 (1978).
59. Misleading statements concerning this issue can be found in many California cases.
An example is State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 59 Cal. 2d 45, 377
P.2d 902, 27 Cal. Rptr. 702, (1963), where the court stated, "When there has been no loss of a
member of the body or loss of its function, it is necessary as a prerequisite to compensation
that the injury result in a decrease in earning capacity or the ability to compete in the open
labor market." Id. at 52, 377 P.2d at 907, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 707. This Note submits that such
statements are not accurate, for compensation is not granted simply upon a showing of a loss
of a body member or loss of its function. The claimant must also show that such a loss will
diminish his earning capacity. For further discussion of this issue, see Department of Motor
Vehicles v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 14 Cal. 2d 189, 93 P.2d 131 (1939): Greenock v.
Drake, 2 Industrial Acc. Comm'n 266 (1915).
60. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(3)(u) (West 1966).
61. Statutory schedules were designed to simplify and expedite the administration of
worker's compensation and to inject certainty and uniformity of treatment in the proceed-
ings. They also act as guides to the insurance industry in estimating costs, and guides to the
injured workers as to the amount of recovery which they may expect to receive. I HANNA,
supra note 9, § 11.01(1).
62. 2 LARSON, supra note 13, § 58.11; Ujevich v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 42
Ariz. 276, 280, 25 P.2d 273, 275 (1933); Imrich v. Industrial Comm'n, 13 Ariz. App. 155, 156,





In California, "[Labor Code] Section 4660 sets forth the criteria for
determining the percentage of permanent disability suffered, and pro-
vides for an official schedule which shall be prima facie evidence of
that percentage for each injury covered by the schedule. '64 California's
unique rating plan65 operates on the premise that the amount of perma-
nent disability benefits awarded should bear a measurable relation to
the loss of earning capacity suffered. 66 Rather than award a financial
recompense based solely on the type of injury sustained and the weekly
earnings of the claimant, the California plan gives additional consider-
ation to the worker's age and occupation. 67 The California schedule is
also singular in that it furnishes only a prima facie guide in the deter-
mination of the ratings. It permits evidence to be introduced at the
hearing to show that other ratings should have been made.68 The final
determination of the existence and percentage of disability is left to the
Worker's Compensation Appeals Board which exercises its discretion
in view of all the circumstances.
69
The preceding section of this Note has given a rough sketch of
how the compensation system operates. Discussion will now focus on
the main thrust of this Note-the treatment afforded sex-
ual-impairment injuries under worker's compensation laws.
63. See notes 46-60 & accompanying text supra.
64. Department of Motor Vehicles v. WCAB, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 1043, 98 Cal. Rptr.
172, 174 (1971). CAL. LAB. CODE § 4660(a) (West 1971) declares that "[in determining the
percentages of permanent disability, account shall be taken of the nature of the physical
injury or disfigurement, the occupation of the injured employee, and his age at the time of
such injury, consideration being given to the diminished ability of such injured employee to
compete in an open labor market." For a discussion of how the California rating system
operates, see S. HERELICK, THE CALIFORNIA WORKER'S COMPENSATION HANDBOOK 85-109
(1976).
65. For a discussion of California's rating plan compared with those of other states, see
I HANNA, supra note 9, § 11.01(3)(a).
66. Id.
67. Id. In most states, flat rate schedules exist whereby a specified number of weeks is
provided for the specified losses. 1 HANNA, supra note 9, § 11.01(2). California's rating plan
is based on the theory that the injury may be more disabling to persons in one occupation
than in another and that the extent of disability will vary with the age of the injured worker,
the power of rehabilitation being considered greatest during youth and declining with age. I
HANNA, supra note 9, § 11.01(3)(a).
68. Bassett v. Thompson Graf Edler Co., I Industrial Acc. Comm'n 60, 61 (1914).
With this rating system, there is the possibility of flexible treatment of disabilities. W.
DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 642-43 (1936).
69. Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pillsbury, 173 Cal. 56, 59, 159 P. 150, 152 (1916). See
also Dalen v. WCAB, 26 Cal. App. 3d 497, 502, 103 Cal. Rptr. 128, 131 (1972).
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Sexual-Impairment Injuries Under Worker's Compensation
Laws
California Law
As previously noted, under California worker's compensation law,
permanent disability benefits are not awarded for physical injuries per
se.70 The impairment must be such as to raise a presumption of inca-
pacity causing a loss of earning power. Because injuries that result
solely in impairment of sexual power do not generally cause physical
limitations for work, nor cause "disfigurement," employees who sustain
such injuries must generally show psychological damage to receive per-
manent disability benefits in California. The following discussion will
focus on two main areas of concern: (1) the physical impairment and
disfigurement associated with sexual-impairment injuries and the like-
lihood of permanent disability benefits being awarded for "physical
disabilities"; and (2) the emotional and psychological problems con-
nected with such injuries and the willingness of judges to award com-
pensation benefits for "psychiatric disabilities."
Physical Disability and Disfigurement
At present, there is no California permanent disability scheduled
rating for impairment of sexual function or sterility. Hence, such inju-
ries necessitate "judgment ratings," 7' to be made pursuant to California
Labor Code section 4660(a).72 The major factors in determining per-
manent disability ratings under that section are loss of earning capacity
and occupational handicap. It is generally agreed in California that
loss of sexual function (impotence),73 injury to the penis,7 4 or loss of
one testicle 75 do not presumptively diminish the injured employee's
70. See notes 53-59 & accompanying text supra
71. For a discussion of nonscheduled disabilities, see I HANNA, supra note 9,
§ 17.04(2)(d). The rating schedule was not intended to be complete. Omission of an injury
from the schedule does not signify that it is not ratable. Injuries not enumerated in the
schedule require nonscheduled ratings or judgment ratings which are determined by com-
paring the particular condition under consideration with the scheduled disability most
nearly analogous to it or by comparing the entire scheme of schedule disabilities with the
injury in question. Id. § 11.01(6).
72. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4660(a) (West 1971).
73. See Lewallen v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 5 Cal. Comp. Cases 186 (1940). In
Lewallen, an employee sustained an industrial injury which resulted in painful coitus. The
Commission included sexual impairment in the factors of permanent disability rating, but
held that none of the factors were such as should seriously interfere with the employee's
ability to work or compete in an open labor market.
74. See Frierson v. WCAB, 40 Cal. Comp. Cases 401 (1975).
75. See Curry v. Permanente Metals Corp., 10 Cal. Comp. Cases 255 (1945). "Medical
opinion almost universally states that the loss of one testicle is not a disability and that it
causes no effect on earning capacity or normal habits of life." Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
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earning capacity, and therefore, without more, do not constitute
"disabilities."
76
"Disfigurement" is another factor to be considered in determining
the existence and degree of a permanent disability in California.77 Dis-
figurement is defined as "[t]hat which impairs or injures the beauty,
symmetry, or appearance of a person or thing; that which renders un-
sightly, misshapen or imperfect or deforms in some manner. 78 The
justification for disfigurement compensation in California is a pre-
sumption that the injury will ultimately impair the employee's earning
capacity by making it more difficult for that employee to obtain and
retain employment.79 In other words, such an injury diminishes the
injured worker's ability to compete in the open labor market.
A North Carolina court stated this conclusion well when it de-
clared, "A serious disfigurement is [one] that mars and hence adversely
affects the appearance of the injured employee to such extent that it
may reasonably be presumed to lessen his opportunities for remunera-
tive employment and so reduce his future earning power."80 In many
states, only those disfigurements ordinarily exposed, such as on the
face, head, neck, forearms, or hands are compensable.8 ' Other states
are more liberal in their approach and permit indemnity benefits to be
The Commission differentiated the loss of one testicle from the loss of two. Losing both
testicles may cause a change in the secondary sex characteristics such as voice, strength and
other features which do affect working capacity, whereas "[t]he loss of one testicle is not
followed by any change in the physiological condition of the individual or in his ability to
procreate." Id. at 255-56. The court lists a number of cases in which workers who have lost
both testicles have been granted permanent disability benefits. In those cases, there was
evidence of actual disabilities.
76. "[L]oss of sexual function in itself does not affect the body strength or cause physi-
cal limitation for work." E. McBRIDE, DISABILITY EVALUATION AND PRINCIPLES OF
TREATMENT OF COMPENSABLE INJURIES 498 (6th ed. 1963). One possible exception to this
general rule would be the situation involving a pornographic movie star who as a result of
the injury became physically unable to perform or to perform with the same degree of profi-
ciency. This situation would represent the rare set of circumstances where the physical ef-
fects of such an injury would actually diminish the worker's earning capacity.
77. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4660(a) (West 1971). See note 64 supra.
78. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 554 (4th ed. 1968). The writer could find no California
cases precisely defining the term "disfigurement." But see text accompanying notes 84-86
infra.
79. See Greenock v. Drake, 2 Industrial Ace. Comm'n 266, 268 (1915); 2 LARSON,
supra note 13, § 58.32.
80. Arrington v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 264 N.C. 38, 42, 140 S.E.2d 759, 762
(1965). "A disfigurement [for worker's compensation purposes] is an observable impairment
of natural appearance of a person." Arkin v. Industrial Comm'n, 145 Colo. 463, 472, 358
P.2d 879, 884 (1961). "A disfigurement then, is a blemish, a blot, a scar, or a mutilation, that
is external and observable, marring the appearance." Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel Co.,
223 N.C. 233, 238, 25 S.E.2d 865, 869 (1943).
81. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 148 Conn. 87, 167 A.2d 458 (1961); 2
LARSON, supra note 13, § 58.32, at 236-37. Under many of these statutes, the claimant does
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granted for disfigurement of bodily areas normally covered by clothing.
These awards are based on the theory that such deformity or scarring
will be discovered upon a physical examination with the subsequent
possibility that it will thereby diminish earning capacity. 82 There are
states that go even further and grant compensation when the usefulness
of a physical function is impaired.
8 3
In Williams v. State Compensation Insurance Fund,8 4 a California
case involving injury to an employee's genitalia, the court discussed the
claimant's failure to raise the issue of disfigurement.8 5 The court stated
that whether disfigurement in California "requires visible mutilation
or, on the contrary, comprehends a functional impairment without ex-
ternal manifestations, is an open question. '86 In response to this query,
one must examine the definition of "disfigurement," the rationale and
purpose of disfigurement compensation and the permanent disability
rating schedule in California.
Disfigurement, by its very definition, connotes external manifesta-
tions.8 7 Descriptive terms such as "impairing the beauty or appear-
ance" and "rendering unsightly" cannot realistically be applied to
injuries that cause no visible deformity, even though such injuries may
impair physical functions.
Because the concept of worker's compensation in California rests
upon the principle of loss or impairment of earning capacity, disfigure-
ment within the contemplation of the Act also is related essentially to
earning capacity. To be compensable in California, an injury must
have the theoretical effect of diminishing the worker's ability to com-
pete in the open labor market. The injury may have such an effect by:
not have to make an actual showing of diminution in earning capacity. It is conclusively
presumed the injuries will have such an effect. See 2 LARSON, supra note 13, §§ 58.30-.32.
82. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Wilson, 210 Md. 568, 124 A.2d 249 (1956). The
court in this case also stated that there are very few parts of the body not exposed in today's
world and cited recreational activities that are often a part of employment programs. Be-
cause these disfigurements would be exposed in the locker room, the court felt they could
thereby impair earning capacity. Id. at 575, 124 A.2d at 252. A New Jersey court stated that
it could not perceive any "distinction between a normally visible, non-disabling disfigure-
ment and one which is normally concealed, non-disabling, but of such nature and extent
that it would be revealed by the customary, pre-employment physical examination. Both
types possess the inherent capacity to impair future earning capacity." Wright v. Purepac
Corp., 82 N.J. Super. 100, 109, 196 A.2d 695, 700 (1963).
83. 2 LARSON, supra note 13, § 58.32, 239-41. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Chambers,
288 A.2d 450 (Del. 1972); Guy Johnston Constr. Co. v. Kennedy, 287 A.2d 658 (Del. 1972).
Under these statutues, no showing that the bodily impairment will diminish earning capacity
is necessary. For discussion of this type of statute and award, see notes 121-32 & accompa-
nying text infra.
84. 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975).
85. Id. at 123 n.3, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
86. Id.
87. See notes 78-80 & accompanying text supra.
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(1) causing the worker to be less able to function physically in an em-
ployment or work capacity (e.g., loss of an eye, leg, finger); (2) causing
the worker to suffer psychological problems that hamper the worker's
ability to work; or (3) leaving visible deformity or otherwise marring
the appearance of the person (e.g., scarring or burning). An injury that
causes impairment of a physical function may not necessarily embody
visible mutilation,88 while an injury resulting in deformity or scarring
does not imply impairment of a physical function. 89 These concepts
compensate for different elements of damage. 90 Impairment of a physi-
cal function is relevant in determining the existence of a "disability,"
but should be of no significance in ascertaining whether "disfigure-
ment" has occurred.9I An injury which causes no visible deformity can
diminish earning power, but it cannot do so by rendering the person
"unsightly."
The permanent disability rating schedule in California has a spe-
cific provision for cosmetic disfigurement and impairment of function
of the face and head.92 This inclusion of facial disfigurement is consis-
tent with the notion that disfigurement requires visible mutilation, for
such injuries are normally visible and do tend to diminish a person's
marketability. There is no provision for disfigurement of other parts of
the body in the California rating schedule, for as Hanna notes, they
rarely prove to be handicaps.93 However, the absence of a provision
for disfigurement of the body in the California schedule does not con-
clusively foreclose disability benefits for such injuries.94 It merely
means there is no presumption that body disfigurement will impair the
worker's ability to compete in the open labor market. A claimant must,
therefore, establish that the disfigurement has had or will have such an
effect before compensation will be awarded.
In addition to the above factors, there are no California cases that
have used disfigurement as the basis on which to compensate injuries
88. For example, an employee inhales toxic substances while at work which render him
sterile. No visible mutilation results, in spite of the physical impairment. Here there is no
"disfigurement" within the general meaning of the word.
89. For example, a worker receives a severe cut on the forehead requiring stitches and
which thereby results in scarring. There is cosmetic disfigurement, but no impairment of a
physical function.
90. Mr. D. Gaines, a disability evaluator for the California Worker's Compensation
Appeals Board in San Francisco, concurs in this conclusion. Interview with D. Gaines in
San Francisco, California (October 20, 1978).
91. For a discussion of disfigurement, see I HANNA, supra note 9, § 11.02(4)-(5); 2A
LARSON, supra note 13, § 65.30.
92. Permanent Disability Rating Schedule, Disability No. 4 (compiled and published
by Division of Industrial Accidents of the Department of Industrial Relations of the State of
California)(on file at San Francisco office, Division of Industrial Accidents).
93. 1 HANNA, supra note 9, § 11.02(4).
94. See id § 11.01(6).
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that impaired physical function but which did not entail visible de-
formity. Apparently, therefore, external mutilation or other impair-
ment of appearance is mandated in order for the claimant to come
within the meaning of disfigurement in California. Assuming such a
conclusion is correct, it appears that sexual-impairment injuries are not
compensable on a disfigurement theory in California. First of all, such
injuries may not leave scarring, mutilation or deformity. However, as-
suming that visible mutilation of the genital area does result, the
worker must still clear the seemingly insurmountable hurdle of demon-




Because an injury to the genitalia causing loss of sexual power or
sterility will not normally impair the worker's physical ability to work,
nor come within the meaning of disfigurement, it becomes necessary to
examine the injured worker's mental or emotional response for the
existence of a possible psychiatric disability. As stated earlier, an "in-
jury" under California worker's compensation law includes mental as
well as purely physical injuries.96 When an employee sustains a trau-
matic neurosis97 or psychosis98 as a result of an injury, it is commonly
held in California and elsewhere that the effects of the neurosis or psy-
chosis are fully compensable.99
It has been said that injuries to the genitals are more likely than
others to lead to disabling emotional disorders. 00 Several California
cases have discussed the issue of "psychiatric disability" in connection
95. However, if California were to adopt the liberal theory used in Maryland and New
Jersey to find loss in earning capacity, see note 79 & accompanying text supra, then sexual
impairment injuries which involved visible mutilation of the genital area would come within
the meaning of disfigurement.
96. See notes 34-35 & accompanying text supra.
97. Neuroses interfere with the person's capacity to function at optimum productivity.
Anxiety is the main characteristic of neuroses. The person may experience difficulty in
sleeping, depression, loss of appetite, and excessively worry about the effects of the injury.
There are eight subtypes of neuroses: (1) anxiety; (2) phobic; (3) depressive; (4) hysterical, (5)
depersonalization; (6) obsessive-compulsive; (7) neurasthenic; and (8) hypochondriacal.
Speech by M. Goldfield, M.D. (Feb. 22, 1975) reviewedin 3 CAL. WORKERS' COMP. REP. 56
(1975).
98. Psychosis "is a mental disorder in which mental capacity, response, ability to recog-
nize reality, ability to communicate, and ability to relate to others are impaired enough to
interfere with capacity to deal with the ordinary demands of life." Id. at 57. "The most
important characteristic of psychosis is its interference with the person's ability to perceive
reality." Id.
99. See IB LARSON, supra note 13, § 42.22; 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 11.01(2)(e).
100. See genera/lv speech by M. Goldfield, M.D. (Feb. 22, 1975), reviewed in 3 CAL.
WORKERS' COMP. REP. 56 (1975). Dr. Franklin Drucker states that the genitals are central
to the personality. Id. at 57.
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with sexual-impairment injuries. A 2 1/2% permanent disability rating
for loss of one testicle was granted in Curry v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity
Co..101 This award was based on a finding of a very slight neurosis and
what the Commission termed, the employee's "psychic fears."102 Frier-
son v. WCAB 03 involved a claimant whose sexual organ was injured.
The Board held that no disability resulted therefrom, though there was
conflicting testimony by expert witnesses concerning the existence of a
traumatic neurosis. In Diaz v. WCAB,' °4 the claimant suffered a back
injury and a moderate neuropsychiatric impairment, of which sexual
impotence was the most annoying element. The referee held that be-
cause impotence was the primary complaint, the psychiatric disability
would be slight to moderate, rather than moderate. 10 5 Lewallen v. In-
dustrial Accident CommissionI06 concerned a claimant who was ren-
dered impotent. The Commission concluded that sexual impairment
would not seriously diminsh the injured worker's earning capacity.
0 7
Notwithstanding these statements and the absence of any evidence of a
psychiatric disability, the Commission awarded a 22% permanent disa-
bility rating of which 5% was attributable to the genital-urinary
condition.
08
The conflicting interests associated with the compensation of sex-
ual-impairment injuries become apparent in this area of psychic disa-
bilities. Compensation judges realize that workers who receive such
injuries suffer great personal losses that are noncompensable under the
worker's compensation system. Rather than deprive workers who have
sustained sexual-impairment injuries of any monetary recovery, the
prior cases demonstrate that judges will at times award permanent dis-
101. 10 Cal. Comp. Cases 255 (1945). A 2 1/% rating entitles the injured worker to
approximately $500. Such compensation most likely represents a sympathy award, or as
Larson phrases it, a "let's-give-the-poor-guy-something" type award. 2 LARSON, supra note
12, § 57.10.
102. 10 Cal. Comp. Cases 260.
103. 40 Cal. Comp. Cases 401 (1975).
104. Civ. No. 13348 (4th App. Dist., Nov. 29, 1973), reviewed in 2 CAL. WORKMEN'S
COMP. REP. 5 (1974).
105. 2 CAL. WORKMEN'S COMP. REP. 5 (1974). The editor's note following the review of
Diaz states that the case impliedly holds that impotence is a ratable factor in determining
permanent disability. Contra, I HANNA, supra note 9, § 11.02(5).
106. 5 Cal. Comp. Cases 186 (1940).
107. Id. at 187.
108. It is unclear from the reported decision whether there was evidence of an emotional
disorder, whether the judge presumed a very slight neurosis would develop in the future; or,
whether the benefits were awarded so that the claimant would not be denied any recovery.
It is hard for judges, being human, not to award compensation for the physical injury itself,
especially when the injury causes no loss of earning capacity and the claimant is denied a
common-law remedy. Whitebook, Permanent Partial Disabili y Under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts, 28 IowA L. RE. 37, 45 (1942).
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ability benefits based on supposed findings of psychic disabilities. 10 9
No figures are available that reveal what percentage of workers who
sustain sexual-impairment injuries receive indemnity benefits. The
cases do indicate, however, that when psychiatric disabilities are found
to exist, the amount of compensation awarded is minimal. The trivial
amount of compensation granted and the weak evidence manifesting
the existence of emotional disorders leave strong doubts as to the bona
fide nature of the psychiatric disabilities. These awards cannot easily
be attacked because of the difficulty of refuting the existence of neuro-
ses or psychoses and the fact that the existence of such psychiatric disa-
bilities is a question of fact for the compensation judges." l0 Such a
practice, however, represents a circumvention of the worker's compen-
sation scheme and demonstrates the need for change in this area.
Other States
States other than California take differing approaches toward sex-
ual-impairment injuries. These states may be categorized into three
distinct groups. The first group consists of states which use the loss of
earning capacity theory in determining the existence and degree of per-
manent disabilities and which have no schedule provisions that enable
the awarding of permanent disability benefits for this type of injury. In
the second group are states which use the loss of earning capacity the-
ory in determining disabilities but which have attempted to ameliorate
or eliminate the usual harsh result that is associated with these nondis-
abling injuries by the enactment of schedule provisions. The third
group is comprised of states which have adopted the whole-man theory
in determining the existence and extent of permanent disabilities.
Those states which use the loss of earning capacity theory in deter-
mining disabilities and which have no schedule provisions covering this
particular type of injury usually deny permanent disability benefits for
sexual-impairment injuries. For example, in Heidler v. Industrial
Commission"1 the Arizona Court of Appeals stated, "[W]e find it ex-
tremely unlikely that sexual impotence alone could result in a loss of
earning capacity"' "l 2 since in "all probability there would never be a
loss of earning capacity in the future stemming from the condition it-
self."" 3 The result is identical when workers sustain injuries causing a
109. Conversations with attorneys and judges practicing in this area of the law confirm
this view.
110. See I HANNA, supra note 9, § 1 1.02(2)(b)-(c); 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 14.01(2)(d).
111. 14 Ariz. App. 280, 482 P.2d 889 (1971).
112. Id. at 281, 482 P.2d at 890.
113. Id See also Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rockey, 278 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955); Hyett v. Northwestern Hosp., 147 Minn. 413, 18 N.W. 552 (1920).
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loss of use of one testicle. ' 4
However, there are rare cases in which permanent disability bene-
fits have been granted upon a showing of a psychiatric disability result-
ing from sexual impairment. In Fort v. Hood's Dairy, Inc.,115
indemnity benefits were granted to a worker who was rendered impo-
tent as a result of an industrial injury. The court held that the claim-
ant's earning power was diminished by the loss of sexual power
because he would no longer be able to function in a competitive
atmosphere. "16
The second group of states includes those which deal with this type
of injury without disrupting the normal compensation disability con-
cept, by enacting appropriate schedule provisions. These provisions are
of two types: (1) disability clauses applicable specifically to sex-
ual-organ injuries; and (2) residual, catchall clauses applicable gener-
ally to miscellaneous injuries. Under these schedule provisions, the
injury is compensated without regard to its effect on earning capacity.
The claimant need not be concerned with making a showing of a psy-
chiatric disability because the physical impairment itself permits the
recovery of indemnity benefits.
17
Mississippi's approach exemplifies the first type of legislation. In
1958, Mississippi made loss of testicles and female breasts scheduled
injuries.' 8 This legislation appears to be a response to a case decided a
year earlier in which an injured worker was denied permanent disabil-
ity benefits for loss of one testicle because he could not establish a dimi-
114. See, e.g., Imrich v. Industrial Comm'n, 13 Ariz. App. 155, 474 P.2d 874 (1970);
Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Ariz. 247, 251, 186 P.2d 951, 954 (1947)
("There is no legal presumption that the functional disability of a testicle, caused by an
injury, creates a permanent partial disability to work and earn wages."); Puffer Mercantile
Co. v. Arellano, 546 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1975); Rosier v. Roofing & Sheet Metal Supply Co., 41
So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1949); Grice v. Suwannee Lumber Mfg. Co., 113 So. 2d 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959). But see Ford Motor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 357 Ill. 401, 192 N.E. 345 (1934)
(permanent disability benefits awarded for the loss of one testicle based on claimant's testi-
mony of loss of earning capacity).
115. 143 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1962).
116. Id. at 15-16. Two other cases have also recognized the possibility of psychiatric
disabilities being suffered as a result of sexual-impairment injuries. The dissent in Walk v.
State Compensation Comm'r, 134 W. Va. 223, 58 S.E.2d 791 (1950), declared: "[T]here is a
strong inference that [the] claimant will develop a psychological neurosis occasioned by his
impotency. Such a result would seem. . . natural, considering the nature of [the] claimant's
injury". Id. at 232, 58 S.E.2d at 796 (Lovins, Pres., dissenting). In Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 66 Ariz. 247, 186 P.2d 951 (1947), the court denied permanent disability
benefits to an employee who sustained an injury to one testicle. The court stated, however,
that if the claimant had suggested that he had suffered a psychiatric disability, then it would
have been inclined to agree. Id. at 252, 186 P.2d at 954.
117. See notes 61-63 & accompanying text supra.
118. MIss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-17(c)(13)-(16) (1972).
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nution in earning capacity.'" 9 A presumption that such losses diminish
earning capacity is questionable in light of medical opinions and cases
mentioned above. 120 The Mississippi legislature apparently made a
policy choice and determined that the state interest in granting some
relief for the injuries outweighed the interest in strictly adhering to the
loss of earning capacity principle.
In contrast to the limited scope of the Mississippi statute, other
states have enacted broad, catchall schedule provisions which permit
the granting of permanent disability benefits for loss of or loss of use of
a member of the body or impairment of the usefulness of a physical
function. 21 These catchall provisions generally require the injured
employee to be unable to receive permanent disability benefits under
any other provision or section of the Act. In Delaware, the worker's
compensation board is granted discretionary power to award equitable
compensation for the loss of or loss of use of any member of the
body.' 22 Under this provision, workers who have suffered loss of testi-
cles or loss of use of sexual organs have been awarded permanent disa-
bility benefits. 23 A Louisiana statute allows permanent disability
compensation to be awarded for injuries which impair the usefulness of
a physical function. 124 An employee who loses the use of any portion
of the body will be entitled to receive permanent disability benefits in
Oklahoma. 25 North Carolina considers "loss of or permanent injury
to any important external or internal organ or part of the body" suffi-
cient for an award of permanent disability compensation.
2 6
The justification for these catchall provisions is a presumption that
losses of bodily function will ultimately impair the earning capacity of
119. See Jones v. Mason & Dulion Co., 229 Miss. 638, 91 So. 2d 715 (1957).
120. See note 114 supra.
121. See 2 LARSON, supra note 13, § 58.32.
122. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2326(g) (1974).
123. Chrysler Corp. v. Chambers, 288 A.2d 450 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972) (indemnity bene-
fits awarded for loss of one testicle); Guy Johnston Constr. Co. v. Kennedy, 287 A.2d 658
(Del. Super. Ct. 1972) (permanent disability benefits granted for the permanent loss of use of
the sexual organ).
124. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1221(4)(p) (West Supp. 1978) provides as follows: "In
cases not falling within any of the provisions already made, where the employee is seriously
permanently disfigured about the face or head, or where the usefulness of a physical func-
tion is seriously permanently impaired, the court may allow such compensation as is reason-
able and in proportion to the compensation hereinabove specifically provided in the cases of
specific disability .... "
125. OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 85 § 22, para. 3 (West 1970); see Ford v. Nellie B. Mining
Co., 208 Okla. 265, 255 P.2d 504 (1954) (permanent disability benefits awarded for loss of
sense and smell under the above statute).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(24) (1972); see Cates v. Hunt Constr. Co., 267 N.C. 560,
148 S.E.2d 604 (1966) (compensation awarded for the loss of a kidney). See also UTAH
CODE ANN. § 35-1-66 (Supp. 1977) (permanent partial disability benefits may be awarded
for loss of bodily function not otherwise provided for).
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the injured worker.127 Such legislation is therefore superficially consis-
tent with the basic premise of worker's compensation-to award per-
manent disability benefits only for those injuries which impair earning
capacity. However, language in some decisions under such statutes
casts doubt upon the validity of this explanation. In Barr v. Davis Bros.
Lumber Co. 128 the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the legislature
realized nondisabling injuries would occur. Rather than deprive the
injured worker of all legal recourse, the legislature felt it just to allow
the worker to have the right to compensation in such cases. 129 The
court in Wilson v. Union Indemnity Co. 130 was equally explicit when it
declared that the catchall provision was designed to fill a void in the
law.131 The court stated that the provision was not strictly compensa-
tory but instead was in the nature of a tort remedy for a personal injury
not affecting earning capacity.
32
The final group of states have abandoned the earning capacity
principle and adopted the whole-man theory in determing the existence
and extent of permanent disabilities. 33 New Jersey is viewed as the
leading exponent of this doctrine, 34 which "challenges the classical
compensation dictum that awards should not be for physical injury as
such." 135 Compensation "is not based upon the interpretation of the
word 'disability' in its narrow sense indicating impairment of working
or earning capacity. It is based rather upon a broad interpretation con-
noting the loss of any physical function or any impairment to the
worker as a physiological unit."' 36 States using the whole-man theory
127. See Chrysler Corp. v. Chambers, 288 A.2d 450, 452 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Amal-
gamated Sugar Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 Utah 556, 558, 286 P. 959 (1930).
128. 183 La. 1013, 165 So. 185 (1935).
129. Id. at 1023-24, 165 So. at 188.
130. 150 So. 309 (La. Ct. App. 1933).
131. Id. at 310.
132. Id. at 312. "[Tlhere is no basis in the philosophy or purpose of workmen's compen-
sation for making nonfault awards which bear no relation to earning capacity merely be-
cause the claimant has suffered some. . . kind of loss which arouses one's sympathy." 2A
LARSON, supra note 13, § 65.30. Many writers note that the trend in jurisdictions using the
earning capacity theory has been to place increasing reliance on the criterion of physical
impairment per se. See M. BERKOWITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-THE NEW JERSEY
EXPERIENCE 78 (1960). There are divergent views on the theoretical justifications of sched-
ule injuries. Employers insist they must be based upon presumptive loss of earnings, while
labor maintains that a worker has a basic human right to compensation for loss of a bodily
member or its function, even if no loss of earning power results. H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 277 (1954). The trend is in the direction of labor's position.
Id.
133. See notes 47-48 & accompanying text supra.
134. Other whole man states are Missouri, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See note 48
supra for possible qualifications of this doctrine in New Jersey.
135. 2 LARSON, supra note 13, § 57.10.
136. Heidel v. Wallace & Tiernan, Inc., 37 N.J. Super. 522, 528, 117 A.2d 678, 681-82
March 1979] SEXUAL IMPAIRMENT INJURIES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
award permanent disability benefits to workers who sustain injuries to
their sexual organs. 1
37
Exclusive Remedy
In view of the fact that sexual-impairment injuries do not gener-
ally qualify for permanent disability benefits, the validity and applica-
bility of the doctrine which makes worker's compensation the exclusive
remedy against the employer is questionable.
A component of all worker's compensation plans is a provision
which declares that when the employer and employee operate under
the worker's compensation Act, and the employee sustains an injury
that falls within the act's coverage formula, the remedy provided there-
under shall be exclusive of all other statutory and common-law reme-
dies.' 38 The remedy is exclusive not only as to the employee, but as to
all claiming through him. Hence, the worker's compensation act may
not be circumvented by actions for loss of consortium. 39 Where the
injury fails to come within the purview of the Act, as when the requisite
employment relationship does not exist, or when the injury fails to arise
out of or in the course of employment, the common-law remedy is not
affected and a suit for damages may be maintained. 40 Under these
circumstances, the injured worker has noight to receive any compen-
sation benefits whatsoever. Therefore, a damages suit can be justified
by reasoning that the legislature could not have intended to destroy
common-law rights of action without substituting statutory
remedies. 141
(1955). This court stated that permanent disability benefits have been awarded even when
the injured worker's earning capacity has not been diminished in the slightest degree. Id. at
528, 117 A.2d at 681. The standard is whether the worker has "lost any physical function
detracting from his body's efficiency." Id. Larson says there is a tendency for the whole
man theory to turn into a "let's-give-the-poor-guy-something" theory. See note 101 supra.
137. See, e.g., Kostida v. Department of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. 629, 634, 247 P.
1014, 1016 (1926) (permanent disability benefits awarded for loss of one testicle on the
ground that everyone "has a right to remain in possession of all those useful members of his
body which are provided by nature"); Hercules Powder Co. v. Morris County Ct. of C.P., 93
N.J.L. 93, 107 A. 433 (1919) (indemnity benefits awarded for loss of one testicle).
138. See notes 30-32 & accompanying text supra. Two code sections in California state
the exclusive remedy provisions. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3600-3601 (West 1971 & Supp.
1978). Section 3706 creates an exception where the employer fails to secure compensation
insurance. Another exception is the "dual capacity doctrine" under which the employee is
entitled to recover damages as well as compensation benefits for injuries subject to the com-
pensation law. 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 22.03(4). Under this doctrine, the employer is
treated as a third party.
139. Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1975); 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 22.03(6)(b). Seealso CAL. LAB. CODE § 3850 (West 1971).
140. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1971).
141. See 2A LARSON, supra note 13, § 65.10. In states where occupational diseases are
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The removal of the worker's common-law rights has been upheld
as a reasonable exercise of the state's police power on the theory that
worker's compensation acts set aside one body of law affecting liability
and insert another, thereby effecting a trade. 142 This "quid pro quo" is
viewed as a compromise which "imposes reciprocal concessions upon
employer and employee alike, withdrawing from each certain rights
and defenses available at common law."143 However, as Larson states,
If this is the justification for the exclusive remedy rule, it ought logi-
cally to follow that the employer should be spared damage liability
only when compensation liability has actually been provided in its
place, or, to state the matter from the employee's point of view, rights
of action for damages should not be deemed taken away except when
something of value has been put in their place.
144
The courts universally have held that when injuries causing sexual im-
pairment fall within the compensation act's coverage, the remedy pro-
vided thereunder is exclusive, even though little or no compensation
may actually be forthcoming. 145 The absence of compensation for non-
disabling injuries is considered part of the "quid pro quo" for certainty
of recovery for disabling injuries.
Hyett v. Northwestern Hospita 146 is a leading case dealing with this
problem. There the claimant sustained an industrial injury which ren-
dered him impotent. He brought an action for damages against his
employer, contending that the compensation act did not provide a rem-
edy for that particular injury. The court disallowed the suit on the
ground the worker's compensation plan represented a reciprocal ex-
change of benefits by both employer and employee. 47 The court
stated, "In consideration of this insured compensation and protection
by the acceptance of the act, [the worker], by necessary implication,
relinquishes his common-law remedies, and thus places a limit on his
rights to that measured and granted by the compensation act." 148 Cali-
fornia has adopted this view, and a court of appeal has held that
not compensable because they do not constitute an "accidental injury," the common law
remedies are not barred because the injury does not fall within the Act's coverage. Id.
142. See Western Indem. Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 692, 151 P. 398, 401 (1915).
143. Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 122, 123 Cal. Rptr.
812, 815 (1975).
144. 2A LARSON, supra note 13, § 65.10, at 4. It is unclear whether the "something of
value" which Larson speaks of, refers to permanent disability indemnity benefits, or in-
cludes medical treatment and/or temporary disability indemnity benefits.
145. See, e.g., Posegate v. United States, 288 F.2d 11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 832
(1961); Smith v. Baker, 157 Okla. 155, 11 P.2d 132 (1932); Freese v. John Morrell & Co., 58
S.D. 634, 237 N.W. 886 (1931). Contra, Boyer v. Crescent Paper Box Factory, 143 La. 368,
78 So. 596 (1918). This last case proceeded on the theory that there should be no wrong
without a remedy. It has been criticized and rarely, if ever, followed.
146. 147 Minn. 413, 180 N.W. 552 (1920).
147. Id. at 415-16, 180 N.W. at 553.
148. Id. at 415, 180 N.W. at 553.
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notwithstanding the fact that little or no occupational handicap may
result from an injury causing sexual impairment, the door to tort recov-
ery is not thereby opened.
49
In Moushon v. National Garages, Inc. ,150 the claimant became im-
potent as the result of an industrial injury. The Illinois court con-
cluded, in dictum, that even if the injury was not compensable under
the permanent disability provision of the statute, a common-law action
would still be barred because the claimant had received compensation
benefits under the act in the form of medical treatment and temporary
disability payments.151 The court held that the exclusive remedy provi-
sion was predicated upon the worker's injury being covered by
worker's compensation provisions and not upon receiving compensa-
tion benefits for the permanent effects of the injury.
152
Moushon held that a common-law action against the employer
would be barred if the claimant received any compensation. Other
courts have held the receipt of compensation benefits is immaterial in
determining whether a damages action may be maintained. What they
consider crucial is whether the injured worker had a right to receive
any compensation. The court in Frank v. Anderson Brothers 5 3 stated
that the right to receive medical treatment constituted compensation
within the meaning of the Act.15 4 Under this rationale, a worker who
sustains an injury that falls within the Act's coverage formula is pre-
cluded from bringing a tort action against the employer, regardless of
the fact that the future receipt of compensation is unlikely. This inter-
pretation is consistent with California Labor Code section 3601, which
declares that the right to receive worker's compensation shall be the
exclusive remedy for the employee's injury.1
55
However, a vigorous dissenting opinion in Moushon v. National
Garages, Inc. 156 did not accept this conclusion. It recognized the ineq-
149. Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 122-23, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 812, 815 (1975).
150. 9 Ill. 2d 407, 137 N.E.2d 842 (1956).
151. Id. at 410-I1, 137 N.E.2d at 844.
152. Id.
153. 236 Minn. 81, 51 N.W.2d 805 (1952).
154. Id. at 84, 51 N.W.2d at 807.
155. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1978). "[A] right is generally a claim which
the law will enforce, while a remedy refers to the judicial means by which it is made effec-
tive." Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 454, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710, 712 (1968) (citations
omitted). Labor Code § 3601 would appear to manifest a clear legislative intent to not allow
a damages action, even if the injured worker will never actually receive compensation. An
example is a case where a worker is rendered sterile because of inhalation of toxic sub-
stances. No medical treatment is needed and the worker loses no time from work. The
worker is precluded from maintaining a tort action against his employer because he had a
right to receive compensation benefits, even though that right may never in fact materialize.
156. 9 Ill. 2d 407, 413, 137 N.E.2d 842, 845 (1956) (Bristow, J., dissenting).
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uity in denying any recovery for the permanent effects of nondisabling
injuries. Justice Bristow declared that if the exclusive remedy feature
bars an injured employee's common-law action, while at the same time
providing no compensation award for the permanent injury sustained,
then the worker's compensation act violates due process guarantees of
the Constitution. 157 Justice Bristow's proposed solution was as follows:
If an employee sustains an injury for which no permanent disability
benefits are provided under the compensation act, then a common-law
damages action should be permitted. 58 If, however, benefits are pro-
vided under the Act for the permanent injury sustained, then, even
though there are elements of damage such as pain and suffering for
which no compensation is provided, no negligence action could be
brought.159 Justice Bristow declared that the intent of the exclusive
remedy feature was to abolish common-law remedy actions only when
a substitute remedy of compensation, such as permanent disability ben-
efits, is provided under the Act for the particular injury sustained.'
60
He was aware that allowing a tort remedy would tend to nullify the
objectives of worker's compensation by subjecting the employer to both
tort damages and compensation. However, Justice Bristow felt that to
deprive the worker of any remedy was too harsh and contrary to the
public policies underlying the compensation legislation and that the ad-
ditional tort remedy was warranted.' 6'
Case law suggests several reasons why Justice Bristow's view has
not been adopted-fear that such a rule would open the door to double
litigation in a great number of cases; 162 the belief that personal injuries
constitute but one right of action that cannot be divided into several
different parts; 63 a hesitancy to violate the clear manifestation of legis-
lative intent expressed in the exclusive remedy provisions; and the be-
157. Id. at 419, 137 N.E.2d at 848. "Ours is a government of constitutional limitations;
of checks and balances. Our system does not tolerate unrestrained overriding of the rights of
individuals in the name of the police power." Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm'n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 634, 640, 33 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1963).
158. 9 Ill. 2d 407, 418, 137 N.E.2d 842, 848. The opinion cited with approval Larson's
proposal of permitting common-law negligence actions for such nondisabling injuries. Id. at
417-18, 137 N.E.2d at 847-48 (citing Larson). Larson states that such losses as impotency
and loss of child-bearing capacity should not go unremedied. He further states that if a
legislature sets out to undo the injustice of denying a remedy for such losses, it would do
better to restore the common-law remedy than to award compensation in violation of the
basic premise of workers' compensation-the loss of earning capacity principle. 2A LAR-
SON, supra note 13, § 65.30.
159. 9 Ill. 2d 407, 418, 137 N.E.2d 842, 848.
160. Id. at 414, 137 N.E.2d at 846.
161. Id. at 418-19, 137 N.E.2d at 848.
162. See Hyett v. Northwestern Hosp., 147 Minn. 413, 416, 180 N.W. 552, 553 (1920).
163. See id. at 417, 180 N.W. at 553; Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal.
App. 3d 116, 122, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1975).
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lief that if such a change is warranted, it should come about by
legislation and not through the courts.
164
Solutions to the Problem
This Note has surveyed the present state of the law regarding in-
dustrial injuries that cause sexual impairment. Consideration will now
be given to changes and improvements that could be made in the Cali-
fornia law to rectify the harsh result that usually accompanies such in-
juries. There is an understandable human pressure to compensate
sexual-impairment injuries that may have life shattering effects but
that may not carry with them the requisite negative economic implica-
tions. 65 This urge or desire to compensate is increased because of the
awareness that the remedy provided under the Act is the only one
available to the injured worker. Countervailing this pressure to com-
pensate is the underlying theory of compensation law, to award perma-
nent disability benefits only for those injuries that cause a diminution
in earning capacity. Compensation is designed only to protect the
worker from economic insecurity and is not a form of "damages" in the
sense of relieving the victim from all the effects of the injury. Because
of this conflict, the remedy to be provided and the solution to be de-
vised lie with the legislature. A policy choice is presented in which the
legislature must weigh the relative interests of the employer, the public,
the injured worker, and the integrity of the worker's compensation
system.
Among the alternatives available to the California Legislature is
adding a specific injury provision covering "loss of or loss of use of
sexual organs" to the California permanent disability rating schedule.
The addition of this provision would permit a sexual-impairment in-
jury to constitute prima facie evidence of a permanent disability. This
change would have very little effect on the compensation system as a
whole and would be arguably consistent with certain facets of the pres-
ent scheme. 166 There are two major shortcomings of this alternative.
First, only a trivial amount of compensation would most likely be des-
ignated for this type of injury. 16 7 Second, there is a danger that work-
164. See Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 122, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 812, 815 (1975); Hyett v. Northwestern Hosp., 147 Minn. 413, 417, 180 N.W. 552, 553
(1920).
165. See note 108 supra.
166. "Arguably" consistent because there would undoubtedly be some question as to the
validity of such a presumption. The loss of taste and smell is included in the California
schedule, and as Hanna states, "[a]lthough such sensory losses ... from a practical stand-
point, produce no real loss of ability to work or earn, they are assigned a theoretical rating
value." 2 HANNA, supra note 9, § 14.01(2)(c). This represents an example of an injury
which is deemed compensable, even though it most likely will not cause a "disability."
167. This award would not compensate the worker for the full effects of the injury and
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ers may attempt to take advantage of such a provision by claiming their
sexual dysfunction was caused by the stresses of the work environment.
A second alternative would be to add a catchall provision to the
rating schedule, whereby all workers who sustain injuries that impair
physical functions would be awarded permanent disability benefits.
68
The purpose of such awards would be to fill a void in the existing law
and to insure that workers would receive monetary recoveries for such
injuries. These sympathy awards could have no possible relation to the
economic consequences associated with the injuries, and would, in ef-
fect, represent tort damages. Adopting such a catchall provision would
have more far-reaching consequences than the previous proposal be-
cause it would entail compensating a wide range of nondisabling inju-
ries besides those causing sexual impairment. This solution would also
manifest an express disregard for the earning capacity principle upon
which the entire worker's compensation system operates. Erosion of
the earning capacity principle would be destructive of the integrity of
the worker's compensation system as a whole.
An even more radical solution would be to adopt the "whole man"
theory and thereby compensate for "injuries" as opposed to "disabili-
ties." 169 Compensation would be granted not only for "disabling inju-
ries" but for injuries that would impair the employee's ability to engage
in activities unrelated to employment. 170 The whole man theory, how-
ever, attacks the basic premise of worker's compensation and has been
discounted by most legal scholars.
17'
A fourth alternative is to use the "dual theory" to determine the
existence and degree of disabilities. 172 However, because nondisabling
injuries would be compensable under this doctrine, the same dangers
associated with the "whole man" theory are applicable to "dual
coverage."
As a fifth alternative in California, the legislature could enact no
changes at all and permit the compensation judges to construe the pro-
would constitute, as Larson terms it, a "let's-give-the-poor-guy-something" type award. See
note 136 supra.
168. See notes 121-32 & accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 133-37 & accompanying text supra.
170. This view is supported by Whitebook, Permanent PartialDisability Under the Work-
men's Compensation Acts, 28 IowA L. REv. 37, 54 (1942). Another writer sets forth a propo-
sal which adds a little twist to the "whole man theory." He would award benefits for injuries
which prevent the person from engaging in the normal pursuits of life and if the injury also
affected the worker's employment, the benefits would be increased accordingly. 1959 U. ILL.
L.F. 655, 659. Another writer has proposed that 100% indemnity should be afforded for all
elements of harm suffered by the worker. Note, A Peafor Modernizing Workmen's Compen-
sation-The Casefor the Worker, I STAN. L. Rav. 126, 133 (1948).
171. See generally 2 LARSON, supra note 13, §§ 57.10, 58.32.
172. See note 60 & accompanying text supra.
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visions of California Labor Code section 4660 liberally. Permanent
disability benefits could be awarded upon findings of "disfigurement"
or "psychiatric disabilities." Such findings would not likely be bona
fide but would be attempts to circumvent the Act and to provide com-
pensation. Such intellectual dishonesty and disregard for the earning
capacity principle should not be encouraged because of the disrespect
for law that such a practice fosters. In addition, some judges may feel
sympathetic towards the claimant's plight and require little or no evi-
dence of visible scarring or emotional problems, while other judges
may be more strict and insist upon a showing that such an injury will
cause a diminution in the worker's earning capacity. Different results
accorded workers who sustain identical injuries with identical effects is
not a desirable situation.
The most equitable solution is to give the worker with a sex-
ual-impairment injury an additional tort remedy 73 by way of a com-
mon-law action for damages. As Larson states,
This would be more equitable from the employer's point of view,
because he would be liable only when actionable negligence attribu-
table to him could be shown, and from the employee's point of view,
because he would not be held down to maximum limits of two or
three thousand dollars for injuries which might, at common law,
bring verdicts of many times that amount.1
74
Worker's compensation benefits paid under the Act, such as medical
treatment and temporary disability payments, would be deducted from
the tort recovery. By this offset, the employer would not be subject to
double liability, in the sense of paying twice for the same elements of
damage. If the worker were unsuccessful in his negligence action, he
nevertheless would be permitted to retain the compensation benefits
received. Under this proposal, permanent disability indemnity benefits
would not be awarded for nondisabling injuries. Instead, "damages"
would be granted upon a showing of employer negligence in a separate
tort action. Therefore, the principle of loss of earning capacity need
not be displaced, nor would strained construction of that theory be
necessary.
This Note advocates an end to the practice of granting small
amounts of permanent disability benefits for sexual-impairment in-
uries under the guise of "psychiatric disabilities." Such sympathy
awards are not consistent with the basic scheme of worker's compensa-
tion and are attempts to circumvent the Act itself. Allowing a separate
tort remedy would place sexual-impairment injuries outside of the
worker's compensation framework for the purpose of providing the
173. This solution has been suggested by Larson, 2A LARSON, supra note 13, § 65.30,
and by the dissenting justice in Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill. 2d 407, 413-20, 137
N.E.2d 842, 845-49 (1956).
174. 2A LARSON, supra note 13, § 65.30, at 18.
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worker 175 with an opportunity to recover for the permanent effects of
the injury. The worker would be required to prove negligence on the
part of the employer, a burden which may prove to be quite difficult.
However, such a burden rightly rests upon the worker for he would still
be entitled to receive compensation benefits, regardless of a failure in
the negligence action, and because such a suit constitutes an exception
to the worker's compensation system.
This Note does not advocate that an additional tort remedy be
made available to workers who receive other normally nondisabling
injuries. Sexual-impairment injuries are different in nature and in-
volve interests that have significant impacts on people's lives. The
United States Supreme Court has declared the interest in procreation to
be a basic and fundamental civil right. 176 Being able to function sexu-
ally appears to be a similar fundamental right, also worthy of great
protection. However, such interests are not recognized under the
worker's compensation system because of its emphasis on the economic
consequences of injuries, as opposed to their psychic and spiritual ef-
fects on workers. Besides involving basic rights, sexual-impairment in-
juries are unique in that they affect a part of the body covered by
clothing so as not to be normally visible and thereby disfiguring, and
they affect members of the body which perform no function in an em-
ployment context and therefore do not generally cause physical limita-
tions for work. There may exist other injuries with similar qualities,
but none which involve such basic interests. For the above-stated rea-
sons, this Note suggests that sexual-impairment injuries should be
treated apart from others and a tort remedy provided therefore.
There is, however, a procedural hurdle that must be overcome
with respect to this alternative. The courts agree that industrial injuries
create but one cause of action that cannot be divided into separate ele-
ments of damage available from separate tribunals. 77 The proposal
presented here would violate this principle by allowing an employee to
recover compensation in an administrative hearing and damages in a
court of law. However, the fairness associated with the providing of the
additional tort remedy, along with its consistency with the principle of
loss of earning capacity, more than offsets the added burden to the em-
ployer. Such a procedural hurdle should not stand in the way of the
needed remedy.
175. This Note does not recommend that loss of consortium suits be made available to
spouses of the injured worker. The worker is still under the Act in the sense of being able to
receive compensation benefits.
176. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1941).
177. Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 122, 123 Cal. Rptr.
812, 815 (1975); Hyettv. Northwestern Hosp., 147 Minn. 413,417, 180 N.W. 552, 553 (1920);
Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 63 Okla. 52, 61, 162 P. 938, 946 (1917).
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There must be a legal recourse when a worker sustains a sex-
ual-impairment injury. Although bestowing the worker with an addi-
tional tort remedy is inconsistent with a major premise of worker's
compensation, it is a change warranted by the unfairness of the present
worker's compensation scheme.
